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One of the greatest impediments to the use of probabilistic 
reasoning in legal arguments is the difficulty in agreeing on an 
appropriate prior probability for the ultimate hypothesis, (in 
criminal cases this is normally “Defendant is guilty of the crime 
for which he/she is accused”). Even strong supporters of a 
Bayesian approach prefer to ignore priors and focus instead on 
considering only the likelihood ratio (LR) of the evidence. But 
the LR still requires the decision maker (be it a judge or juror 
during trial, or anybody helping to determine beforehand 
whether a case should proceed to trial) to consider their own 
prior; without it the LR has limited value. We show that, in a 
large class of cases, it is possible to arrive at a realistic prior that 
is also as consistent as possible with the legal notion of ‘innocent 
until proven guilty’. The approach can be considered as a 
formalisation of the ‘island problem’ whereby if it is known the 
crime took place on an island when n people were present, then 
each of the people on the island has an equal prior probability 
1/n of having carried out the crime. Our prior is based on simple 
location and time parameters that determine both a) the crime 
scene/time (within which it is certain the crime took place) and 
b) the extended crime scene/time which is the ‘smallest’ within 
which it is certain the suspect was known to have been ‘closest’ 
in location/time to the crime scene. The method applies to cases 
where we assume a crime has taken place and that it was 
committed by one person against one other person (e.g. murder, 
assault, robbery).  The paper considers both the practical and 
legal implications of the approach. We demonstrate how the 
opportunity prior probability is naturally incorporated into a 
generic Bayesian network model that allows us to integrate other 
evidence about the case. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
When the police apprehend someone suspected of a crime, one 
of the first questions they ask the suspect is where he was at the 
time of the crime. This is potentially a very diagnostic question: 
if the suspect can show that he was elsewhere, then he cannot 
(except in special cases that we ignore in this paper) have 
committed the crime. If, however, it can be shown that he was at 
the crime scene at the time of the crime, then he is ruled into a 
(relatively) small subset of possible perpetrators.  In classic 
investigative terms this establishes opportunity which, along 
with motive and means, is often considered necessary for 
conviction. Thus, finding out about the suspect’s whereabouts in 
relation to the crime scene and time is a critical starting point for 
most investigations.   
In this paper we will argue that the same logic applies to later 
stages of the legal process: in particular, when the suspect is 
charged with the crime and how we evaluate the strength of 
evidence against him. Information about the suspect’s 
whereabouts in relation to the crime scene is crucial – often as a 
starting point for establishing a case for or against him, before 
other evidence is presented.  
One key point, typically neglected in formal analyses of 
evidential reasoning, is that case information often allows us to 
make reasonable judgments about the probative force of 
opportunity evidence. Indeed, such information, typically used 
to drive an investigation, is equally relevant in court when we are 
assessing the probability that a suspect is guilty. 
Why is such information often neglected in formal analyses? 
We will argue that this neglect hinges on several flawed 
assumptions, including: (i) the belief that at best opportunity 
evidence ‘fails to exclude’ a suspect, but it does not have a 
positive confirmatory value on the hypothesis that he committed 
the crime; and (ii) that placing someone at the crime scene (close 
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to time of crime) at most means he is one of N other possible 
perpetrators, and this set includes all people who could have 
committed the crime, so N is a very large number (which is also 
hard to estimate). Thus, information about opportunity at best 
gives imprecise and typically very small prior probabilities, e.g. 
1/(some large population size). 
As we shall see, both assumptions are wrong. We present a 
principled approach to quantifying information about 
opportunity evidence that corrects these misconceptions.  This 
approach maps naturally onto typical investigative practices1 and 
shows how opportunity evidence is often a key factor in 
determining a suspect’s guilt. 
Our objective is to provide a simple and realistic method for 
estimating what we call the “opportunity prior probability”; this 
is the probability that a suspect is guilty of the crime for which 
he is accused based only on evidence about his proximity (in 
space and time) to the crime scene location and time.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we explain 
how our approach can be viewed as a natural and practical 
extension of the classic ‘Island problem’ scenario for the use of 
Bayes to assess probability of guilt given evidence and a prior 
probability of guilt. In Section 3 we provide a formal definition 
of the Crime Scene (CS) and Crime Time (CT), while in Section 
4 we define the formal notion of the extended CS and CT, which 
is necessary for establishing an opportunity prior in cases where 
the suspect has not been proven to be at the CS during the CT. 
This leads to an opportunity prior 1/N for the suspect. In Section 
5 we explain how N can be reduced in certain pathological cases. 
In Section 6 we address the concern of convicting innocent 
bystanders when N is very low. Finally, in Section 7 we describe 
a generic Bayesian Network model that enables us to incorporate 
the opportunity prior along with all other relevant evidence in 
order to compute a posterior probability of guilt. 
2  BAYES AND THE LAW: THE CLASSIC 
ISLAND PROBLEM 
To illustrate the full potential of using Bayesian probabilistic 
reasoning in legal arguments it is common to consider the classic 
‘island problem’ whereby a crime is assumed to have taken place 
on an island when it is known n people were present2–4. This set 
of people is the ‘reference class’ for the crime and the defendant 
is one of them. Before any evidence is considered each of the 
people on the island has an equal prior probability 1/n of having 
carried out the crime. The Bayesian approach for legal 
arguments, as described for example in5–8 can be summarised as 
follows: The prior odds against guilt (n-1 to 1 in this case) are 
multiplied by the likelihood ratio (LR) to arrive at the posterior 
odds of guilt. The LR is the probability of the evidence under the 
prosecution hypothesis divided by the probability of the 
evidence under the defence hypothesis. Suppose, for example, 
we discover evidence linking the defendant to the crime such as 
that he/she has a DNA profile matching a DNA trace left by the 
person who committed the crime. Suppose the LR for this 
evidence is 10,000. Then if n = 100 there is a very strong 
posterior probability that the defendant is guilty (about 99.9%), 
whereas if n = 1,000,000 the posterior probability of guilt is only 
1%. It is clear, therefore, that while the LR offers important 
information about the probative value of evidence, it is our prior 
probability of guilt that determines whether or not we believe the 
evidence is sufficient to convict. 
We now provide a formalisation of the island problem 
whereby we seek to narrow down the crime scene and time as far 
as can possibly be agreed. If, for example, the crime definitely 
took place in a particular village in the island on a particular quiet 
evening then, although all the islanders could have been present, 
we should be able to provide a good estimate of those who 
actually were there during that evening. On an island where n = 
1,000,000 this might reduce the relevant n to 100. If it is proven 
that the defendant was one of the people in the village then the 
prior probability of guilt is 1/100. If the defendant insists he/she 
was not present that evening, then the first task for the 
prosecution is to determine the ‘closest’ place/time where it is 
agreed the defendant was. If, for example, he/she was certainly 
at a garage one mile from the village two days earlier then we 
need to consider the area covering the village and a one mile 
circumference outside it, and the two days leading up the crime 
being committed. We consider this to be the ‘extended crime 
scene/time’. Let N be an estimate of the number of people who 
were in this extended crime scene and time. Then we know that 
the crime must have been committed by one of these N people 
and that the defendant is one of these. 
In the next two sections we define formally the notions of 
crime scene and crime time (section 3) and the extended versions 
of these (section 4) in order to arrive at objective values for the 
number n and N respectively. 
Note that the parameter values we set in all of the examples 
presented could easily be replaced with distributions rather than 
point values, but we have used point values for ease of 
explanation, without any loss of generality. 
3   DEFINING THE CRIME SCENE AND 
TIME 
In what follows we assume a crime has taken place and that it 
was committed by one person against one other person (e.g. 
murder, assault, robbery). 
The Crime Scene (CS): this is the smallest physical area 
within which it is certain the crime happened.  
 
Example 3.1: 
a) If a person was attacked in a 20-metre alleyway, but it 
is not certain which specific point then the CS is the 
entire alleyway. 
b) If a person was mugged while standing next to a 
particular lamppost by Piccadilly Circus tube station 
then the CS would be an area about one metre around 
the lamppost. 
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c) If the victim was shot in a theatre, then the CS is the 
area of the theatre covering any point from which a shot 
could have been fired.  
The Crime Time (CT): this is the smallest time interval (𝑡, 𝑡′) 
between which it is certain the crime took place. This interval 
could be as short as a millisecond (in cases where we have 
verified time recordings of the crime) or as long as months or 
even years for old cases. 
The above examples are typical of scenarios in which our 
proposed method is most useful since the crime scene is 
reasonably specific and any disagreements and uncertainty about 
it are tightly bounded. However, in some scenarios there may be 
fundamental disagreement about the CS.  
 
Example 3.2: Suppose the police claim the crime (a murder) 
took place in the alleyway between 01.00 and 01.30 but the 
defence shows that the body could have been dumped there 
and that the time of death could have been any time after 
midnight (when the victim was last seen alive at a night club 
one mile away) and 01.30. Then, in such a case, the crime 
scene would be an area covering not just the night club and 
alleyway, but anywhere within which it would be possible 
for the victim to have got to, such that it would also be 
possible for the victim’s body to have got back to the 
alleyway by 01.30. Even for such a relatively short period of 
time this could be a very large area since the victim could 
have been taken in a car and driven 30 miles away before 
being returned to the alleyway.  
 
The number of people, n, at CS during CT: Although we 
generally do not know who was present at CS during CT it is 
possible to estimate the number of people n (other than the 
victim) who were. For example: 
 If, in Example 3.1(a) CT is between 01.00 and 01.30 (i.e. 
early hours of the morning) n might be up to 5, whereas if 
CT is between 08.00 and 08.15 (a shorter, but much busier 
period) it could be 30.  
 If, in Example 3.1(b) CT is 17.30-17.33 on a Thursday then 
n could be as high as 200, whereas if CT is 04.00-04.15 on 
a Tuesday morning n might be closer to 5. 
 If, in Example 3.1(c) the victim was an actor on stage during 
a crowded performance then n would be the capacity of the 
theatre. If, however, the attack took place in the foyer while 
the performance was taking place then n would be a very 
low number (typically only a handful of people would be in 
the foyer at any time during the performance). 
 In Example 3.2 the CS covers an area about 30 miles around 
the area of the alleyway and night club over a period of 90 
minutes at night. If this was an urban area including a major 
city then n would be an estimate of the number of residents 
and visitors present during that period (a very large 
number).  
Whoever committed the crime must, on the above 
assumptions, be among the n people who were present at CS 
during CT. In the absence of any other evidence each such person 
has a 1/n probability of being the criminal. If it is proven that 
the defendant is one of these people, then the prior 
probability of guilt is 1/n. 
We shall deal with the case where it is not proven that the 
defendant was in the CS during CT in the next section, but it is 
important first to clear up a very important and common 
misunderstanding that applies to all of the above examples. As 
mentioned earlier what we have done is formalise the reference 
class of possible suspects. Variations of this approach have been 
considered many times and criticised on the basis that more or 
less anybody in the world could have been there and that 
therefore none of these people can be ruled out as suspects. We 
can dismiss this concern by emphasizing that the number n is an 
estimate of the actual number of people who were actually there, 
NOT the number of people who could have been there. To 
hammer this difference home consider the following: 
 
Example 3.3: From CCTV footage, two men Fred and Bill 
are known to have been in a room when a third man was 
murdered. No other people were in the room at the time and 
so one of Fred or Bill committed the murder. Fred is charged 
with the crime. In the absence of any other evidence there is 
no doubt that ½ is a reasonable prior probability for Fred’s 
guilt. Suppose, however, that the CCTV footage only shows 
that Fred plus a second man whose identity we do NOT know 
was in the room. In theory, any man in the world could have 
been there. But Fred’s prior probability of guilt must be 
unchanged at ½. It is a fallacy to claim – as some have – that 
the probability of guilt is 1/k where k is the number of all 
people who could theoretically have been at the scene. 
 
Hence, when n is small and it is proven that the defendant 
was at CS during CT the prior probability of guilt 1/n is relatively 
high.   
 
Example 3.4:  In a Dutch murder case in Simonshaven in 
20119 , the CS is known to be a very small area of a quiet 
forest and the CT is known to be a fairly short period of time 
(between 8.00pm and 8.30pm on a Saturday evening). The 
suspect X was found there close to the body of his wife. He 
claims they were both attacked by a man coming out of the 
bushes.  There is no dispute that the suspect was present at 
CS during CT. The question is: how many other people were 
in the CS during the CT. Based on local knowledge, a 
generous estimate for the defence might be n = 5.  So, the 
prior probability of guilt before considering any evidence 
may be set no lower than 1/5. 
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4   DEFINING THE EXTENDED CRIME 
SCENE AND TIME WHEN IT HAS NOT 
BEEN PROVEN THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS AT THE CRIME SCENE DURING 
THE CRIME TIME 
In general, the defendant will dispute having been present at CS 
during CT. Our task is hence to determine the extended crime 
scene and time based on the suspect’s ‘closest’ proven time and 
location to CS and CT. The notion of ‘closeness’ is derived from 
both distance from CS (i.e. location) and time from CT and 
defined by considering the most ‘recent’ known locations where 
X was either before or after CT. Specifically, we consider: 
 Case 1: Let L be any location and 𝑡1 the time where it is 
proven X certainly was before time 𝑡 (this could include 
location CS of course) such that it was physically 
possible for X to get from L to CS before time 𝑡′.  
Consider the area whose centre is CS and whose 
perimeter is d(L) where d(L) is the distance of L from 
CS. Let N be the total number of people who were in this 
area between time 𝑡1and time 𝑡′. Then exactly one of 
these people – which includes X - must have committed 
the crime. 
 Case 2: Let L be any location and 𝑡2 the time where it is 
proven X certainly was after time 𝑡 (this could include 
location CS of course) such that it was physically 
possible for X to get from CS to L between time 𝑡 and 
𝑡2. Consider the area whose centre is CS and whose 
perimeter is d(L) where d(L) is the distance of L from 
CS. Let N be the total number of people who were in this 
area between time t and t2. Then exactly one of these 
people – which includes X  – must have committed the 
crime. 
Note that, in general, there will be at least one instance of 
each of cases 1 and 2. Each instance results in a number 
𝑁1, 𝑁2, … , 𝑁𝑘. 
 
Let 𝑁 = min⁡{𝑁1, 𝑁2, … ,𝑁𝑘} 
 
Then, by definition, X is one of exactly N people who could 
have committed the crime and, in the absence of other evidence, 
1/N is a lower bound for the probability that X committed the 
crime. This probability is also a realistic and sensible prior for 
the probability of X’s guilt. We can also conclude that a 
reasonable prior probability for X being at the crime scene is n/N. 
 
Example 4.1:  Consider the case of a murder in the foyer of 
a theatre during a performance. The murder occurred 
sometime between 21.00 and 21.10. Suppose that it is proven 
that the suspect was in the theatre that evening but the suspect 
denies being in the foyer between 21.00 and 21.10. However, 
it is proven he was in the foyer when he entered the theatre at 
19:00 and when he left at 21:50. So we calculate: 
 𝑁1: the number of people who were in the foyer 
between 19:00 and 21:10. If the performance 
started at 19:30 then this will be approximately 
the number of people who watched the 
performance plus the staff in the foyer.  
 𝑁2: the number of people who were in the foyer 
between 21:10 and 21:50. Assuming the 
performance finished at 21:45 this number will 
likely be slightly smaller than 𝑁1 since some 
people will have left before 21:10 and some will 
not yet have left the theatre. 
In this example it would be pointless considering any agreed 
time or location where X was before or after he entered and 
left the theatre since it would give rise to a number 𝑁 larger 
than 𝑁2. We conclude that 𝑁 = 𝑁2 in this case. 
 
Example 4.2: In example 3.1(a) above suppose the CS is 
an alleyway in Barking (East London) and CT is 03.00 to 
03.30, but the suspect claims he has never visited the CS 
and that he was at home H (20 miles from CS) during the 
entire CT. It is proven he was at home H at 01:00 (the last 
known time before t) and at work W (10 miles from CS) at 
06:30 (the first known time after 𝑡′).  
 
In this example we have 
 Location H: in this 𝑁1is the number of people 
who were within an area 20 miles around the 
alleyway between 01:00 and 03:30.  
 Location W:  in this case 𝑁2 is the number of 
people who were within an area 10 miles around 
the alleyway between between 01:00 and 06:30. 
It is unlikely any other known location would lead to a 
smaller number than 𝑁1or 𝑁2 so 𝑁 is the minimum of 𝑁1and 
𝑁2. In other words: the set of possible perpetrators is the 
smallest extended crime scene/time (in terms of the number 
of people who were there) of which the defendant is a 
member. 
 
Example 4.3 In example 3.1(a) above suppose the suspect 
lived 200 miles from CS and denies ever being close to CS. 
Suppose also that the crime took place several years before 
the suspect was arrested. In such a case the ‘closest’ 
known time and location could be a very long way from 
the CS and a long time before or after CT. In such a 
situation N could be very large - the number of people who 
lived and visited a very large area over a prolonged period 
of time. If, for example, the CS is somewhere in central 
London and if the ‘closest location’ we have for the 
suspect is a location 15 miles from the CS 6 months before 
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the CT, then 𝑁 would be in the order of 40 million – the 
number of people who lived in or visited an area including 
the whole of Greater London during that 6-month period.  
5   REDUCING THE NUMBERS n AND N AND 
HANDLING PATHOLOGICAL CASES 
While the above approach attempts to constrain the ‘reference 
class’ of potential suspects as much as possible in most cases, it 
should be possible to reduce n and N further.   For example, it 
seems reasonable to always exclude from n and N an estimate of 
the number of people in the area during the period that could not 
physically have carried out the crime. Depending on the type of 
crime this could mean excluding all people under a certain age, 
all people of a certain sex, all people with certain types of 
physical disabilities etc. However, this touches on the critical 
notion of ‘capability/means’ which is distinct from opportunity 
and which would normally be considered as evidence during the 
case (unlike the pure location/time based opportunity evidence 
that we have argued should determine the prior probability). In 
this case the lawyers should make it clear that, if the capability 
evidence was explicitly used to determine the prior then it should 
not be counted again as evidence against the defendant. One of 
the benefits of the BN approach that we describe in Section 7 is 
that it explicitly avoids such double-counting. 
There are also pathological cases whereby the number N (for 
the extended crime scene location) is massively inflated by the 
inclusion of people passing through the area during the extended 
time period who could not have been present at the actual CS 
during the CT. This is especially true for events that attract large 
numbers of people to an area for brief periods. 
 
Example 5.1: Suppose the crime took place on 1 October in 
a small village with 100 residents. Suppose the ‘closest’ 
location the defendant is known to have been was 10 miles 
away on 5 October. Then N is the number of people who 
were within 10 miles of the village between 1 and 5 October. 
However, suppose that this area includes a football stadium 
and that on 3 October a match took place that attracted 
20,000 fans from abroad. It is known – from airport and hotel 
records – that almost all the visitors arrived and left on the 
same day (3 October) and therefore could not physically 
have been at the CS during the CT. However, by our 
definition, N includes all 20,000 visitors. This is clearly 
inflated. Although we cannot rule out any of the 20,000 
visitors from committing the crime, there is no reason why 
we cannot reduce the number based on an estimate of the 
number who came and left on 3 October. To not do so would 
be similar to the fallacy highlighted in Example 3.3 - treating 
the unknown ‘other man’ in the room of two suspects as 
requiring a different prior from the case where we know the 
identity of both men.  
 
Another possible complication is where the defendant has – 
a priori – a lower probability of having been at the CS than 
others. 
 
Example 5.2: Suppose the CS is a town in North East 
Scotland, but the closest known location for the suspect is 
his home town Bournemouth where he is known to have 
been both the day before and the day after the CT (the 
defendant claims to have been there for the whole period but 
only the day before and after have been independently 
confirmed). Because Bournemouth and North East Scotland 
are 500 miles apart the extended area includes the whole of 
the UK. Now, while it is certainly possible for the suspect to 
have got to North East Scotland in the time interval, in the 
absence of any other evidence it is surely reasonable to 
assume that the prior probability he did so is much less than 
people living closer to the town in North East Scotland.  This 
suggests that we might need to consider a distance-weighted 
computation when calculating priors. 
6  THE RISK OF CONVICTING INNOCENT 
BYSTANDERS 
The solution presented above works well when it is known that 
the defendant was in the vicinity of the CS fairly close to the CT, 
but it may be problematic when it is proven that the defendant 
was very close to the CS and very close to the CT. In such cases 
N will be a very small number, and the prior probability, 1/N, 
will, consequently, be high. 
 
Example 6.1: Suppose that a man Y, living alone, has been 
murdered in his house. This is in a very quiet district with no 
previously reported crimes, and with just one neighbouring 
house 20 metres away.  The neighbour X, also a man living 
alone, was known to have been at home on the night of the 
murder, although it is not known if he visited Y. The CS is 
Y’s living room and the CT is 9.00-11.00pm.  By considering 
an extended CS to be a 20-metre perimeter around the CS, it 
is accepted that X was in the extended CS during CT. In such 
a situation N will be extremely low, typically N = 2, allowing 
for the possibility of a rare visitor to Y (invited or uninvited).  
As X is one of the N, his prior probability of guilt is 50%.    
 
In Example 6.1, X may well become a suspect simply based 
on this 50% prior. The danger is that, with a prior probability of 
50%, little additional evidence may be needed to meet the 
standard of proof. If the standard of proof requires a posterior 
probability of 95%, it is sufficient for conviction that the 
evidence presented by the prosecution has a likelihood ratio of 
19 (0.50/0.50 × 19 = 0.95/0.05). This is problematic since some 
of the cases that start with a high prior, because it is known that 
the defendant was very close to the CS very close to the CT, are 
cases where the defendant is innocent, and just happened to be 
nearby. The proposed solution for determining the prior 
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probability makes it very easy for innocent bystanders to be 
wrongfully convicted. 
One way to handle this problem is to add a strong requirement 
of robustness to the standard of proof, so that a defendant can 
only be convicted on evidence with a low likelihood ratio if other 
hypotheses have been investigated so thoroughly that it is highly 
unlikely that evidence could be produced against someone else. 
7   INCORPORATING THE PRIORS INTO A 
BN MODEL THAT ALSO HANDLES 
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT N AND n 
In order to properly incorporate the prior opportunity probability 
with other potentially complex and related evidence (as well as 
unknown hypotheses) to compute a rational posterior probability 
of guilt, it has been widely acknowledged that a Bayesian 
Network (BN) model is an ideal formalism10–12.   
A BN is a directed graph, together with an associated set of 
probability tables. The graph consists of nodes and arcs as shown 
in Figure 1.  
The nodes represent variables – some of which are discrete 
and non-numeric, such as the Boolean variable ‘Suspect 
committed the crime’ which has two states “True” and “False”; 
and some of which, like N as described above, are numeric and 
may be discrete or continuous. The arcs represent causal or 
influential relationships between variables, and so enable us to 
represent dependencies between different pieces of evidence. 
Associated with each node is a Node Probability Table (NPT). 
For a discrete node with discrete parents the NPT captures the 
relationship between the node and it parents by specifying the 
probability of each of its states given every combination of 
parent states. For a numeric node with parents the NPT is 
generally specified as a conditional probability distribution.  For 
a discrete non-numeric node without parents, the NPT simply 
specifies the prior probability associated with each state. For a 
numeric node without parents the NPT is normally specified as 
a probability distribution.  
Once a BN has been constructed we can enter observations 
(evidence) on any node and perform Bayesian inference to 
update the probability of each unobserved node – here we are, of 
course, especially interested in the updated probability of the 
node ‘Suspect committed the crime’. This process (called 
Bayesian propagation) is complex for all but the smallest models 
but widely available BN tools (that implement standard 
propagation algorithms) enable us to easily build and run the 
computations automatically13.   
Figure 1 presents a generic BN model for incorporating the 
values n and N described above in such a way that – before any 
other evidence is presented – the prior probability of guilt is n/N 
as demanded of our method.  Some intermediate nodes primarily 
used to enable us to transform continuous probability values into 
Boolean nodes according to the ‘Binomial trick’14 are hidden 
(this trick simply inserts a hidden  integer node of  two values 
{0,1} as a child of the continuous node c and defines its 
probability as a Binomial(1, c) distribution); dotted edges signify 
that there is at least one such hidden node on the path. The full 
model is available for download15 and may be run in the freely 
available version of AgenRisk16. In addition to the nodes n and 
N we have nodes: 
 “Suspect at CS” is a Boolean node for which the 
probability of True is equal to n/N  
 “Suspect committed the crime” is a Boolean node for 
which the probability of True is equal to: 
o 1/n when “Suspect at CS” is True;   
o 0 when “Suspect at CS” is False;   
 “Other committed the crime” is a Boolean node which 
is True when “Suspect committed the crime” is False, 
and False when “Suspect committed the crime” is True 
 Various Evidence nodes (shaded) that are defined 
according to the evidence accuracy idiom17 and whose 
NPTs encapsulate the Likelihood Ratio of the 
evidence,  and are dependent on the particular type of 
evidence.  
When we enter exact values for n (e.g. n = 10) and N (e.g. N 
= 100) and execute the model we get the expected prior 
probability values for both suspect at CS and suspect committed 
the crime (see Figure 2). 
We can also enter uncertain evidence about n and N in the 
form of probability distributions as shows in Figure 3. In Figure 
4 we have entered some evidence that the suspect was at the CS.  
This could be, for example, forensic evidence found at the 
scene that matches the suspect or a credible eye witness - the 
NPT for the latter is defined in Table 1, which takes accounts of 
reasonable errors in such identifications. 
 
Table 1 NPT for node "Evidence suspect at CS" 
Suspect at CS False True 
False 0.999 0.1 
True 0.001 0.9 
 
It should be noted that the BN propagation also provides us 
with the likelihood ratio for any Boolean hypothesis node H 
(such as ‘Suspect at crime scene’ or ‘Suspect committed the 
crime’) with respect to any evidence observed E (such as the eye 
witness evidence). This is because the BN provides us with the 
values of P(H) and P(not H) before the evidence is entered and 
the values of P(H | E) and P(not H | E) after the evidence is 









In this example, reading off the relevant probabilities from 
Figures 3 and 4 we get a likelihood ratio of approximately 898 
for the eye witness evidence with respect to the ‘Suspect at crime 
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scene’ hypothesis, but a lower likelihood ratio of approximately 
8.5 for the same evidence with respect to the ‘suspect committed 
crime’ hypothesis. Note that the BN calculations take account of 
all of the other dependencies and prior information in these 
computations.  
Finally, suppose we also have evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that the suspect committed the crime (where the 
evidence has a likelihood ratio of 50 that is encoded into its NPT) 
then the posterior probability that the suspect committed the 
crime increases to nearly 98% as shown in Figure 5.  However, 
any contrary evidence supporting the hypothesis that somebody 
else committed the crime would, of course, reduce this 
probability. 
8   CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have presented a novel approach to modelling opportunity 
information in a legal context. It clarifies several misconceptions 
about the question of prior probability, thus avoiding some of the 
key objections to using Bayesian approaches to evaluate 
evidence. It also unifies good inferential practices, used during 
police investigations to identify the whereabouts of a suspect at 
the time of the crime, with the corresponding application of 
opportunity information in the evidence evaluation phase. This 
has implications both pre-trial and in the courtroom. 
As it allows for a systematic treatment of opportunity 
information our approach should be of use pre-trial to help 
investigators and prosecutors assess the evidential case against a 
suspect and thus inform subsequent decisions about whether 
there is sufficient evidence to prosecute. It should also be 
relevant to how prosecution or defence teams formulate their 
arguments, allowing them to incorporate opportunity evidence in 
a principled manner. We also believe that it has relevance for 
how evidence is presented in court. One common criticism 
levelled against Bayesian approaches is that prior probabilities 
are solely the province of the trier of fact (which in UK and USA 
might be a jury of laypeople). A critical problem here is that if 
the jury is presented with statistical evidence (such as DNA 
evidence) they are left with the difficult task of combining this 
quantitative information with their prior beliefs. By showing the 
jury how to factor in opportunity evidence along with other key 
evidence in the case our proposed approach could help alleviate 
some of these difficulties. 
Another common objection to the use of prior probabilities 
is that it seems to conflict with the legal presumption of 
innocence. Our approach addresses this objection since our 
account interprets the presumption of innocence to say that the 
defendant should be treated no differently from any other person 
who also had the opportunity to commit the crime. In other words 
the defendant is as probable to be the perpetrator as anyone else 
with the same opportunity, absent other evidence in the case.  
Finally, we acknowledge that our proposal only applies to 
cases where it is known that a crime has been committed, but 
there is uncertainty as to the identity of the perpetrator. But in 
some cases we are uncertain as to whether a crime has been 
committed at all, for example in cases where a mother is accused 
of killing her baby, or someone is charged with dangerous 
driving. In such cases identity is not an issue, and so the prior 
must be calculated differently. A solution for this problem is a 
question for future research. 
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Figure 2 State of model when n = 10 and N = 100 
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Figure 3 State of model when n and N are distributions rather than point values 
 
 
Figure 4 State of model after some evidence is entered 
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Figure 5 Evidence suspect committed crime (with LR = 50) entered 
